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ABSTRACT. If language and thought are to be taken as objective, they must respond to how the world is. I propose 
to explain this responsiveness in terms of conditions of correction, more precisely, by taking thoughts and 
linguistic utterances to be assessible as true or false. Furthermore, the paper is committed to a form of qui-
etism according to which the very same thing that can be (truly) thought or expressed is the case: ‘soft 
facts’ as opposed to hard, free-standing facts, independent of any possible rational activity of grasping 
them. 
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1. Introduction 
Stanley Cavell, with characteristic elegance, argued that Kant’s rejection of psycholo-
gism in the theory of knowledge and Frege’s rejection of psychologism in logic was 
followed by Wittgenstein’s rejection of psychologism in psychology. After Wittgen-
stein, not only it is open to suspicion to propose a reduction of the justification of 
knowledge or of deductive processes to psychological, causal, mechanisms; the re-
ducibility of psychological processes to psychological mechanisms is also put into ques-
tion. The opposition to these varieties of psychologism has a common starting point: 
the project of accounting for the normative aspect of knowledge, logic, thought and 
language. 
 In this essay I will focus on the normative character of thought and knowledge (a 
normativity that I will take for granted), and I will relate it to the intrinsic evaluability 
in terms of truth or falsity that the contents of our judgements and the meanings of 
our utterances share: the purpose of this paper will be to link normativity to a concep-
tion of truth as a value (or, in a less extreme version, to the idea that being true is posi-
tively evaluable). Our thoughts about the world and the concepts that make them out 
are themselves norms; not norms that individual thinkers impose to the world, neither 
norms that merely reduce to the acceptance of the language community to which the 
thinker belongs, but norms that are at least partially dependent on how the world is. 
By defending the idea that concepts are both features of thoughts and features of the 
world, the normative/factive split loses some of its attraction. Furthermore, norms 
cease to be psychological projections onto the world. 
1 I am grateful to M. J. García Encinas, M. J. Frápolli, P. Horwich, M. Morris, H. Bensusan, F. Martínez-
Manrique, J. J. Acero, audiences at the universities of Granada, Valencia, Santiago de Compostela and 
Sussex, and the other contributors to this volume for their useful comments to previous versions of 
this paper. The remaining infelicities are, of course, not their responsibility. 
Manuel DE PINEDO 138 
 
                                                     
 This will have another desirable effect: to silence a variety of sceptical doubts with 
respect to our entitlement to speak about meaning, mental content or epistemic justi-
fication. The sceptic can set two kinds of problems. On the one hand, he can ask how 
we know that our thoughts are in touch with the world. In its more traditional form, 
the sceptical question can be phrased like this: “how can you be certain that the ob-
jects and persons which your beliefs are about actually exist?” On the other hand, a 
more modest sceptic can question the certainty of any one of our beliefs. After con-
ceding that there is a world populated by objects and persons, he will ask “how do you 
know that a is F?” 
 Our answer to the first (global) sceptic starts by pointing out that scepticism is not 
entitled to pose questions from nowhere, that is, that it needs a ground, a set of as-
sumptions, from which to challenge our world-view. Doubt, not less than belief, re-
quires justification.2 Answers to this form of scepticism have, in the last twenty years, 
synthesized around the notion of normativity or normativeness. Several authors, in-
spired by Kripke’s controversial interpretation of Wittgenstein (and, more often than 
not, clearly opposing his conclusions) have united under the idea of normativity the 
properties which arguably make impossible any form of causal theory of meaning and 
content. A discussion about the correct interpretation of Wittgenstein’s considerations 
about rule following is the ideal place to test, not only our ideas about normativity, but 
also about realism. After this discussion I will oppose attempts, such as Paul Hor-
wich’s, to separate intrinsic normativity from normative import and their complemen-
tary argument that the search for truth can be fully accountable as a mere instrumental 
strategy for the satisfaction of desires. 
 Finally, and to avoid that an evaluative reading of truth, meaning and content may 
be understood as relegating them to a secondary, non factive, level, I will defend that 
correct predications of truth identify truth-bearer with truth-maker: a true thought 
(content, meaning, proposition) is a fact. This position has been called ‘identity theory 
of truth’. I prefer to speak about an identity thesis about truth, as I believe such a thesis 
is neutral with respect to the variety of logico-semantic theories concerning the role of 
“is true”, even if it tells against correspondentist and coherentist conceptions. Holding 
an identity thesis forces one to explain what sorts of entities facts are if they must be, 
simultaneously, thinkable, expressible and the case. I will briefly appeal to the notion 
of ‘soft facts’ to answer some of these questions. By doing so, I will have to answer a 
worry concerning the compatibility of taking truth to be a value, of endorsing an iden-
2 The local sceptic accepts that doubts require justification, but finds himself entitled to challenge any 
given specific belief. I won’t take issue with this sort of scepticism: I think that accepting the fallible 
nature of our knowledge is commendable and that there are promising lines of argument to reduce 
the anxiety we may feel in the face of these sorts of doubts. I sympathize with the part of the David-
sonian project that claims that the only way to make sense of something as a system of beliefs is by 
appeal to a public world common to the believer and the interpreter (in this case, the challenger) 
which works as the tribunal for the adequacy of such a system. A radically misguided world-view or 
system of beliefs is uninterpretable and, hence, not a world-view at all. If beliefs cannot be ascribed in 
isolation but only within a network, it is safe to assume that any belief is more likely to be true than 
false if it is properly justified within the system in which it belongs. 
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tity thesis about truth and of accepting a “quietist” reading of Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy. If truth is the value of thoughts and propositional contents in general, and we 
value a content as true if it is the case, it could seem that we are offering an account of 
thoughts in terms of something else, namely facts. This would be too constructive a 
move to fit well with the quietism defended in section II. However, no such a reduc-
tion is in view if facts themselves are seen as conceptually articulated. Neither facts are 
accounted for in terms of thoughts, nor thoughts in terms of facts. Rather, the identity 
thesis highlights the mutual dependence of both. 
2. Rule-following 
A certain way of understanding Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative is in 
line which much recent defence of particularism in ethics: if one must act in such a 
way as to be committed to the maxims that can be inferred from our actions, then the 
emphasis would be not in general rules or principles that guide our actions but rather 
on the actions themselves. The principles have derived normativity, at least insofar as 
we consider the unfolding of our practical life. A virtuous person, to use a very 
unKantian term, is not a person of principles, but a person attuned to the practical 
demands of particular situations, a person able to perceive, so to speak, what line of 
action would be correct in the given circumstances. An alternative, generalist, ap-
proach would have it that the virtuous person is one capable of entertaining the cor-
rect general rules for action and to deduce from them what must be done in particular 
occasions. However, the promise of adopting this strategy to explain ethical delibera-
tion seems to be cut down by something like Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s re-
marks about rule-following. To infer general norms from a particular token of behav-
iour is in danger of an infinite regress: an indefinite number of rules can be proposed 
to account for any given action. More precisely, any rule can be so reinterpreted as to 
fit with the action (in fact, with any finite series of actions).  
 Kripke centres on mathematical rules. This is doubly apt: on the one hand we tend 
to think of mathematical rules as especially independent of our mathematical prac-
tices. Our thinking about mathematics is prone to the Platonist temptation of imagin-
ing that they deal with eternal, unchangeable, objects. On the other hand, and as a 
consequence of that, we have clear ideas as to what is the correct way to proceed in 
doing mathematics: anyone trained in mathematics would surely agree about the out-
come of most mathematical problems involving, say, addition of natural numbers. 
However, not even in such clear cut cases are we entitled to claim correctness. Kripke 
insists: any rule can be made to fit any actual (i.e., finite) pattern of addition. Because 
the question is not one about what I will, in fact, say if I am asked to add 7 and 5, but 
about what I should say. A “should” like that cannot be grounded either on finite prac-
tices or on universal rules: the former underdetermine the action, the latter can always 
be reinterpreted and no final interpretation is accessible to us. Hence, Kripke con-
cludes, the most we can hope for is the support of our peers. “Should” is to be ac-
counted for in terms of communal agreement: we cannot answer the sceptic, who 
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demands not just a distinction between it seems right to me and it is right, but also be-
tween it seems right to us and it is right. 
 All this would make Kant very unhappy. He oscillates between the particularism 
outlined above and a noumenally based generalism and both seem to be undermined 
by Kripke’s considerations. Our ethics, but also the very possibility of thinking about 
the world, is precluded if we are convinced by Kripke. This is so because the deploy-
ment of concepts in our thoughts about the world must be understood in terms of 
commitments to norms of correct use, on pains of falling back on a mere ‘causalist’, 
dispositionalist conception of thought, one where there is no way to answer the 
“should” question in terms other that “is”. It is not just scepticism that lurks here. The 
very idea of having thought, of being directed to the world, seems in danger. We are 
cut off from the world since there is no way to have our concepts resonating norma-
tively to how things are. “How things are” cannot be verification independent. The 
world is, as it were, as our community agrees that it is (and a person is virtuous if her 
actions accord the publicly sanctioned rules). But this is giving up the idea of a world 
and giving up the idea of virtue. 
 The sections following the present incursion on Wittgensteinian exegesis and clos-
ing this essay try to develop the idea that meaning (content) and truth are unavoidably 
normative and also that their normativity is interrelated. Being more precise: under-
standing of meaning, possession of content, should be responsive to its evaluation as 
correct or incorrect (the response being reassertion or retraction). An important part 
of the discussion of such normativity takes as its starting point Wittgenstein’s ideas 
about rule-following such as they appear in paragraphs §§ 185-242 of his Philosophical 
Investigations. As the topic is well known, I will be brief. My aim is not so much to be 
faithful to the variety of positions but to offer a bird-eye view of the possible options. 
Here is Kripke introducing the debate: “Suppose I do mean addition by ‘+’. What is 
the relation of this supposition to the question how I will respond to the problem ‘68 
+ 57’? The dispositionalist [or, in general, the naturalist] gives a descriptive account of this 
relation: if ‘+’ means addition, then I will answer ‘125’. But this is not the proper ac-
count of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I 
meant addition by ‘+’, I will answer ‘125’, but that, if I intend to accord with my past 
meaning of ‘+’, I should answer ‘125’” (Kripke 1982, p. 37). What would constitute a 
normative explanation of such a relation? What conditions must be fulfilled in order 
to be entitled to say that someone is following a rule? What kind of obligation charac-
terizes the correct obedience to a norm, the adequate use of a word, a true judgement? 
Five lines of response have been given to these questions: 
1. When we speak of the normative character of a rule we are actually referring to a 
series of mechanisms that compel the alleged subject to follow it (naturalist). 
2. Such conditions cannot be fulfilled and, hence, any talk of obligation is mis-
placed (sceptical). There is no guarantee that in following a rule I am re-
specting my past understanding of the rule. This is so because any ‘under-
standing’ of a rule can be reinterpreted in such a way that any action could 
agree with it and any action could be in disagreement. There is only the 
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community to appeal to in order to give sense to the idea of a rule being 
correctly followed. But, alas, the problem reproduces in the case of the 
community. Therefore, Wittgenstein offers us a sceptical paradox to which 
he gives a sceptical solution. This is, grosso modo, Kripke’s proposal. 
3. There is only room to speak about rule-following when the subject belongs to a 
community which can approve or assent to the behaviour; the meaning and 
extension of concepts is gradually constructed by their use (communitarian-
ist/ constructivist). Crispin Wright could be seen as a proponent of this 
strategy if it were not unfair to ascribe to him such a simplistic version of it. 
4. The capacity to follow rules is to be understood in terms of the subject’s grasp 
of free-standing principles, i.e., principles that are prior and independent of 
actual practices of rule-following (Platonist). 
5. The normative character of rules (and, in particular, of words and concepts) is 
unanalysable. Each instance of a rule-following practice has the same regu-
lating character as the abstract formulation of the rule (quietist/pragmatist). 
 The naturalist option, by refusing to incorporate a prescriptive element in the 
evaluation of practices, gives up on normativity altogeher and leaves the doors wide 
open for scepticism. The communitarianist option, as Kripke himself points out, only 
manages to transfer the problem from the individual to the community, leaving the 
questions without answers (and, ultimately, not silencing the sceptic either). I will 
come back to these. The Platonist answer cannot be an interpretation of Wittgenstein 
being as it is one of the main targets against which Wittgenstein’s discussion is di-
rected.3 According to the Platonist, the correct use of a concept, the correct grasping 
of a meaning amounts to adapting oneself to an extension determined previously to its 
acquisition and use. It is one of the central theses of the quietist/pragmatist answer 
that the Platonic option shares with the others the idea that the correctness of an ac-
tion and the conditions that make it correct can be characterized independently of one 
another, as if the first were a train perfectly fitting some tracks set up in advance, to 
use Wittgenstein’s image. The sceptical paradox is only apparent; in fact, paragraph § 
201 (the starting point used by Kripke to develop the paradox) rejects the existence of 
such a paradox. Rather, what Wittgenstein does is to place us facing a dilemma, one of 
horns of which is the paradox and the other Platonism; Kripke attaches too much im-
portance to Wittgenstein’s arguments against the Platonist horn, the communitarianist 
answer avoids them both by making correctness dependent upon the ratification of 
the community. However, both interpretations leave aside Wittgenstein’s emphasis on 
the need to avoid the regress of interpretations: understanding a rule is not the same 
as interpreting it. Each act which manages to follow a rule correctly is, at least, as 
normatively fundamental as the rule itself. One understands a rule by making use of it 
and using a rule is not interpreting it (if this was so, believing that one is following a 
rule —or receiving the approval of the community— would be the same as following 
3 Wittgenstein 1953, § 218. 
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it, what would open the way for a private following of rules —or for a contractualist 
relativism without underlying normativity). The quietist option avoids commitment to 
any of the horns by pointing out that the dichotomy is only apparent and that fidelity 
to Wittgenstein involves philosophical unmasking of dichotomies and opposition to 
any form of constructive theory of meaning. This is not negating that there is meaning 
or content but negating that they can be reduced or explained in terms of something 
else. Sections III to VI of this essay try to articulate a way of organizing these ideas. 
 The sceptical and quietist readings are freely based on Kripke 1982 and McDowell 
1984 respectively. An interesting comparison of both readings (and also of the com-
munitarianist or constructivist one offered by Wright) with a clear bias towards the 
second, can be found in Thornton 1998. 
 More recently, McDowell has made explicit some important consequences of his 
quietist reading of Wittgenstein in the context of what he has called ‘second nature 
naturalism’, that is, a minimal naturalism which does not depend on the natural sci-
ences for its definition. McDowell uses an analogy from Aristotle’s ethics to explain 
his conception of the relation between the two logical spaces, that of reasons and that 
of laws. The epistemological worries do not touch Aristotle, and that is why, in his 
conception, the idea that the features of ethics are real is not a result of defending the 
idea that ethical facts can be studied independently of people’s participation in ethical 
life. This is so, because for Aristotle nature cannot be identified with the realm of law: 
To focus the way this conception can serve as a model for us, consider the notion of second na-
ture. (...) Second nature could not float free of potentialities that belong to a normal human or-
ganism. This gives human reason enough of a foothold in the realm of law to satisfy any proper 
respect for modern natural science. (...) [W]e arrive at the notion of having one’s eyes opened to 
reasons at large by acquiring a second nature (McDowell 1994, p. 84). [Ortega y Gasset expressed 
this idea by insisting that culture is merely a special direction we give to the cultivation of our 
animal potencies.] 
 The notion of second nature allows us to keep nature partially “enchanted” with-
out returning to pre-scientific superstition. According to McDowell, Kant gets very 
close to this conclusion. However, given that he does not contemplate second nature 
naturalism, he has no option but to place the connections between intuitions and con-
cepts outside nature, in the framework that distinguishes between the phenomenal 
and the noumenal. McDowell also calls his naturalism of second nature, “naturalized 
Platonism”. It is Platonism because it confers certain autonomy to the sphere of rea-
son, but it is naturalized in that this space is not in isolation from anything “merely” 
human, as in “rampant Platonism”.  
 McDowell explains how rampant Platonism can be said to be the object of Witt-
genstein’s criticism and naturalized Platonism the alternative picture at which he is 
driving. This is a very different reading of Wittgenstein’s to that offered by Kripke 
(see Kripke 1982). In the reading that McDowell rejects we cannot speak of subjects 
having their eyes open to the requirements of reason, unless these requirements can 
be reconstructed out of independent facts, namely in terms of social interactions: we 
cannot see meaning and understanding as autonomous. A consequence of the idea 
that any independence of meaning is rampant Platonism is that “how things are (...) 
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cannot be independent of the community’s ratifying the judgement that things are 
thus and so” (ibid., p. 93). According to McDowell, this reading contradicts Wittgen-
stein’s “quietism”, his rejection of any constructive ambition. McDowell agrees that 
this discussion presupposes a deeper type of dualism, between nature and norm, but 
claims that, while Kripke’s Wittgenstein tries to reconstruct one side of the dualism 
from the terms of the other, his own proposal of a naturalism of second nature is 
more Wittgensteinian in that it is not constructive philosophy: it does not claim that 
meaning is constructed socially but rather that  
[h]uman life, our natural way of being, is already shaped by meaning. We need not connect this 
natural history to nature as the realm of law any more tightly than by simply affirming our right 
to the notion of second nature. [and, earlier on the same page] This leaves no genuine questions 
about norms, apart from those that we address in reflective thinking about specific norms, an ac-
tivity that is not particularly philosophical (ibid., p. 95). 
3. The value of truth 
The idea that meaning and mental content are normative is the idea that a theory of 
meaning and content is forced to give an account of facts like the following: if a sub-
ject S believes that p and that p → q, S ought to think that q or, if S says that p and that 
p → q, S ought to answer yes to the question q? This is not the most common way to 
understand the task of a theory of content. Within the functionalist tradition in the 
philosophy of mind, a theory of content is thought to be a search for causal (disposi-
tional, teleological) conditions to explain why someone who thinks that p → q, and 
wants that q, will do p. In other words, the aim of naturalist theories of content is to 
give an account of the relationship between mental states, perceptual episodes and 
behavioural output in plainly factive terms. The naturalist looks for the laws of thought; 
an evaluative theory of content looks for norms. The question to ask to the defender of 
such a project is whether the logic of factive relations can account for the normativity 
of mentality and language. A nomological story finds itself in difficulties doing justice 
to the intuition that to have this or that belief or to say this or that thing, can be correct. 
The key to these difficulties is the very concept of truth, essential for the defence of 
any explanatory project, of any theory. 
 A conception of truth that does not incorporate its evaluative character opens the 
door to scepticism. On the other hand, an account of truth which merely points out 
that truth is an unanalysable value could lead to a fatal separation of the rational and 
normative sphere from the factive and nomological one. The proposal I make to 
avoid such a desperate dualism is to claim that the predicate “is true” calls our atten-
tion towards a very special form of correspondence: identity. According to this pro-
posal truth bearers are identical to truth makers. In other words, a proposition is true 
when it is the case. The identity thesis, like the evaluative theory of truth, is not self-
sufficient. If the facts identical to true propositions do not include normative facts, it 
is difficult to see how to avoid a different fatal result, Bradley’s predicament: we say 
about something that it is true if it is the case, but we cannot reach that which is the 
case and, hence, truth is unreachable. But, if the impossibility to reach facts is the in-
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superable hiatus between the normative and the factive, the dichotomy could be di-
luted by simply making manifest that facts rest on a conceptual and, hence, normative 
mattress. This gambit is traditionally related to moral realism, and a non-Platonist 
form of it is needed to properly understand the role of content and meaning.4 
 Both elements of my proposal about truth, value and identity, have been defended 
by other authors. Both Michael Morris and Michael Luntley have recently offered a 
theory of truth as value, the latter using the Prussian name ‘disciplinary theory of 
truth’. On the other hand, and also recently, Jennifer Hornsby and Julian Dodd have 
argued for an identity theory of truth. Of course, the roots of both proposals can be 
found much earlier. The idea that truth is a value has its origin in Plato’s philosophy 
and a broad repercussion on the medieval discussion about the True, the Good and 
the Beautiful. The most direct way to dispense with the capital letters from these con-
cepts is to highlight that, in the same way as beautiful is predicated of objects and 
good of actions, true is predicated of propositions, identifying them, in that case, with 
facts. This is what the identity thesis about truth does, a thesis that also has historical 
predecessors such as Hegel, Bradley, Frege or early Heidegger. I am not aware of any 
attempt at joining both theories but it is worth noting that both Luntley and Hornsby 
draw inspiration for their respective defence of value and identity in an account of 
truth from the philosophy of John McDowell. 
 What is the relation between truth and content? Why is the notion of truth so cen-
tral for content? The two authors who explicitly defend an evaluative theory of truth, 
Morris and Luntley, coincide on their diagnosis. Whatever a state with content might 
be, it must be a state subject to evaluation (for instance, evaluated as true or false in 
the case of cognitive states). But, to think of something as true or correct is motiva-
tion enough to believe it: one ought to believe those things which one takes to be true. 
Knowing of a proposition that it is true is all the justification needed to believe it (of 
course, this also applies to cases where the proposition known to be true is not fully 
understood, as in deferential uses; in cases where the proposition is understood, to say 
that knowing that it is true is motivation enough to believe it is trivial). Knowing what 
4 The deep link between moral realism and a defence of the normative character of truth is explicit in Mi-
chael Morris’s evaluative theory of truth, which I will presently review, and in McDowell’s discussion 
of rule-following. Morris’s worry is that, if the normativity of truth and content is not complemented 
by a rejection of the dualism fact/value, “ought”/“is”, ascriptions of truth and content may be rele-
gated to mere convention. McDowell also starts off by rejecting the Humean dualism of reason and 
passion and the non-cognitivist conception of morality according to which the motivation to behave 
correctly comes from two separate factors, one cognitive, the other volitive. The non-cognitivist, like 
the communitarianist about rule-following, demands that we are capable of recognizing instances of, 
say, kind actions from a perspective which does not assume familiarity with the evaluative concept 
“kind”, that is, from a perspective external to the practice of evaluating actions as kind or unkind. 
Once that this sort of demand stops putting pressure on us it is possible to cease searching for a solid 
and external foundation for our evaluations. This search leads to Platonism, scepticism, naturalism or 
communitarianism, all of them examples of constructive philosophy which aim at explaining norms 
in terms of something else. 
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a statement means determines the circumstances where it would be correct or incor-
rect to use it.5  
 Luntley’s argument for a disciplinary conception of truth can be summarized as 
follows. There are contentful states and events, including speech acts and mental 
states. Contentful states (at least judgements, beliefs and other cognitive states), no 
matter what their other characteristics are, are essentially correct or incorrect, true or 
false: “The very idea of content ascription involves then a notion of rational sys-
tematicity of content that underwrites the idea that contents are the sorts of things 
that can be incorrect” (Luntley 1996, p. 70). It is possible to ascribe contents because 
it is possible to assume that anyone who makes meaningful statements or possesses 
contentful mental states is rational, i.e., ought to be ready to modify the content of her 
mental states or retract her statements if she was shown that they are incorrect, false 
or inconsistent with other contents or assertions of hers. This is why, according to 
Luntley, the truth or falsity of content must depend on something exterior to the mere 
use of the faculty of judging: “It is the idea of our judgements being disciplined by 
something independent of will” (ibid., p. 72). However, there are proposals to explain 
this discipline external to our will which do not appeal to states of the world but 
rather to the intersubjective agreement of the linguistic community to which the sub-
ject belongs. I have suggested before, while discussing rule-following, that the norma-
tivity needed for something to count as “a rule being correctly followed” cannot derive 
from the consensus of the community, from a kind of contract between them. Luntley 
agrees on this point: the community can account for the systematic character of con-
tent attribution (that is, it can account for the fact that someone who judged that p and 
q would be committed, obliged, to judge that p) but not for the fact that those con-
tents must respond to how the world is. The appeal to community consensus trans-
lates the problem from the individual to the group: the world ceases to be the shadow 
of the subject’s thought to become the shadow of intersubjective agreement. We need 
something that is not only independent of the subject’s will but also independent of 
the community’s will.6 
5 There is an obvious objection waiting for us here. It is not sufficient that a proposition be true to be-
lieve it, because it may be completely uninteresting to us: nobody can be blamed for refusing to have 
beliefs, no matter how truthful, about, say, the average level of lactose in Armstrong’s blood during 
the last Tour of France. Parallel to this, the truth of a proposition is not sufficient to express it: it may 
be irrelevant or, even worse, the consequences of making it public may be dreadful (and, hence, the 
obligation to keep silent overcomes the obligation to tell the truth). The easiest way to avoid this ob-
jection is to place value not in believing or giving expression to everything which is true, but rather in 
demanding that everything which is believed or expressed be true (besides being relevant, discrete, 
etc.). By making truth a necessary but not sufficient value for something to be thought or expressed 
we can avoid, not only the “fact-sucker” conception rejected in this footnote, but also the possibility 
of considering valuable to say the truth even if it is irrelevant or, worse, used to lie (for instance, an-
swering the question “Who killed grandma?” with “Either I did or the butler did”). Thanks to Mi-
chael Morris and Tobies Grimaltos for calling my attention to these issues. 
6 A contractualist proposal must explain in virtue of what the need to distinguish between “it is correct” 
and “it seems correct to me” in order to be entitled to talk about correction (as Wittgenstein points 
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 But it would be to fall back into the Platonist horn to expect that we could estab-
lish what the world is like independently of our theory of meaning. Luntley summa-
rizes such mutual dependence with two slogans: “semantics exhausts ontology” and 
“ontology disciplines semantics”. The second slogan, which underlines the idea that 
the very notion of semantic error involves the subject’s obligation to retract a content 
in virtue of how things are, points towards a radically externalist individuation of con-
tents. Thus, it is possible to explain the relationship between the normative character 
of truth and the essential link between semantics and ontology by using an identity 
thesis about truth. 
4. Intrinsic normativity vs. Normative import 
Any defence of the interdependence between content and truth-value which serves as 
a premise in the argument for the normativity of truth and meaning must answer the 
following objection: let’s accept that language and thought are normative and that they 
are so in virtue of the impact that truth and meaning have in our understanding of 
them. From that it does not follow that truth and meaning are intrinsically normative; 
it only follows that they have normative consequences, normative import, for lan-
guage and thought. This dichotomy allows for a non-normative analysis of truth and 
meaning. This kind of criticism has been labelled by Paul Horwich, who defends a 
minimalist conception of truth and an analysis of meaning in terms of use, more pre-
cisely, in terms of regularities of use. In “Norms of Language” (chapter 8 of his book 
Meaning [1998]) he offers some examples of concepts which can be naturalistically ana-
lysed without questioning their normative import. His examples, I believe, are slightly 
tendentious. Even though killing is prima facie wrong, explains Horwich, it does not 
follow that a purely dispositional and non-normative account of “x kills y” cannot be 
offered (likewise, from the fact that “the kid ought to take his umbrella” does not fol-
low that “x takes his umbrella” cannot be explained non-normatively). It could be ob-
jected that killing y is not prima facie wrong (imagine that x opens the window and the 
Sun’s reflection blinds a driver who dies as a consequence). What is wrong is murder-
ing y, which is killing y “intentionally”, “in cold blood”, “deliberately”, “for x’s bene-
fit”, etc. Yet, for that reason, there is no possibility of giving a non-normative descrip-
tion of “x murders y” (likewise with respect to “x takes his umbrella”: the normativity 
of “the kid should take his umbrella” is derived from that of “the kid should avoid be-
ing harmed (by getting wet, for instance)”; but no non-normative account of that 
seems possible). 
 The Wittgensteinian notion of use applied to define meaning has to be robust 
enough to explain the normative import of meaning and it is doubtful that a non-
normative conception of use can do the task. Wittgenstein insists that use is as fun-
damental as any interpretation (in order to avoid a regress of interpretations), that we 
can grasp meaning in a flash, that normally we don’t need more justification, more ap-
 
out at the end of the famous paragraph § 258) does not apply as well to the case “it is correct” vs. “it 
seems correct to the community”.  
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peal to interpretations, to use words the way we do. This highlights a conception of 
use according to which any reduction of meaning to it translates the discussion of 
normativity from meaning to use. (Mere regularity cannot be enough because an infi-
nite number of rules can accord with any series of uses.) Furthermore, the reduction 
of meaning to regularities of use seems too substantial to fit within Wittgenstein’s 
anti-theoretical conception of philosophy, with which Horwich sympathizes.7 After 
all, Wittgenstein does not offer us a reduction of meaning to use, but an identification 
of both. Use is an unanalysable primitive, as we have seen with respect to rule-
following: it can be argued that the normativity of meaning is the normativity of use 
because use is something intrinsically semantic. The definition of meaning as use that 
Horwich derives from Wittgenstein in order to account for meaning in non-semantic 
terms has a serious danger: it could make meaning itself non-semantic because Witt-
genstein’s identification goes both ways: linguistic meaning is use! The identification 
of meaning and use, if it has an impact on the debate concerning the normative char-
acter of meaning, it does so by emphasizing such a character. It is precisely uses of 
words that are correct or incorrect. Horwich himself gives a very clear expression to 
this thought in his discussion of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical development: “(...) a 
vital constraint on how the term “use” must be understood in the context of Wittgen-
stein’s account of meaning is that there be the possibility of appreciating that we have 
been saying (and thinking) false things —i.e., applying words incorrectly” (Horwich 
1998, p. 9). Notice that the normative aspect of “use” is explicitly linked to truth, sug-
gesting that truth is the norm that (assertive or judgemental) uses of words and con-
cepts have to answer to. 
 A different way to tackle the claim that meaning and truth are normative, one that 
Horwich also resorts to, is to insist that the preference for true beliefs is merely prag-
matic. The norm for thoughts and assertions isn’t really their being true, but their 
maximizing the chances of, say, the satisfaction of our desires. The more useful a be-
lief, the truer. This line, also championed by neo-pragmatists such as Rorty in their at-
tempt at escaping from the metaphysical tradition that places truth and things-as-they-
really-are in a sublime realm of their own, constructs a philosophical theory that flies 
in the face of a commonsensical idea: to have true beliefs places you in the world in a 
way that false ones don’t and, because of that, they are more useful if we want to have 
an impact on the world (for instance, changing it so that it satisfies our desires). Here 
is Rorty spoiling the insight:  
(...) our obligation to be rational is exhausted by our obligation to take account of other people’s 
doubts and objections to our beliefs. This view of rationality makes it natural to say, as James 
does, that the true is ‘what would be better for people to believe’ [Pragmatism]. But of course what 
7 I completely agree with Horwich’s claim that what is central to Wittgenstein’s philosophy are his meta-
philosophical considerations rather than his accounts of meaning. I also agree with his diagnosis of 
the shift from the Tractatus to the Investigations: the change is not one of moving from a theory of 
meaning to another, from one that identifies meaning with reference to one that identifies it with use. 
The shift is rather a consequence of realizing the inconsistency between the anti-theoretical commit-
ment of his philosophy and an excess of theoretical baggage in the Tractatus. 
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is good for one person or group to believe will not be good for another person or group (Rorty 
1997, p. 149). 
Why not? James’s quote makes the truth-value connection explicit. But “what is better 
to believe” can be glossed in terms of believing what is the case (if relevant to my and 
others’ rational desires, if one wants) and so improving the odds of finding our way 
around the world. To reduce the value of truth to usefulness in furthering desires may 
be motivated by a laudable negative to separate the realm of truth from the realm of 
particulars and experience. However, the separation still works beneath proposals 
such as Horwich’s or Rorty’s. A complete rejection of the separation has no use for 
any of the two sides of the dualism. And still Rorty and Horwich want to define truth 
in terms of satisfaction of desires, but this assumes that we can make a neat distinction 
between the satisfaction of desires and the disinterested, contemplative, search for 
truth, in such a way that the only sense that can be made of the latter is its contribu-
tion to the former. This move goes against the quietism recommended in section II 
and ignores the possibility of an identity thesis about truth, that will be defended in 
the following section, according to which there is no principled difference between 
what can be thought and what can be the case. 
 Furthermore, it demands an analysis of desires as opposed to the one of beliefs: in 
a belief it is valued that it fits the world, in a desire it is valued that the world fits itself 
to the desire’s content. For instance, the desirability that our beliefs be true seems to 
have the same direction of fit that beliefs have: what is desired is not that the world 
fits our desires, but rather that our beliefs fit the world. We need a separation between 
satisfied desires and apparently satisfied desires that matches the separation between 
“is correct” and “it seems correct to me”. Let’s think about someone who wants pink 
walls in her house and hires a lazy but chemically competent painter who, secretly, in-
serts an LSD patch on his costumer’s skin managing to make her think that the walls 
are pink. It seems unavoidable to appeal to intrinsic normativity when thinking about 
such a story. The LSD-induced state of affairs is not one that satisfies the initial desire; 
after all, the walls are not pink no matter how they look like to the costumer. And, 
valuing the desire as an unsatisfied one must be done in terms of what the world is 
like, not merely in terms of how the world appears to the agent. 
5. True thoughts and facts 
A normative and realist theory of truth leads to a defence of the identity between truth 
bearers and truth makers. If truth is to play a motivating role with respect to the mak-
ing and expressing of judgements, and that motivating role is played by mundane facts 
(instead of the community assent, for instance), there is only a short step before claim-
ing, with Frege, that a true thought is a fact.  
 Hornsby calls a theory according to which a true thought and a fact are identical an 
identity theory of truth. The most traditional form to express the thesis is to say that 
truth bearers (propositions, contents, thoughts in the sense of contents of acts of 
thinking rather that the acts themselves) are identical to truth makers (candidates to 
this role: facts understood as states of affairs, facts understood as combinations of 
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Fregean senses). The identity thesis about truth can be seen as a limiting case of a cor-
respondentist theory of truth, a thesis according to which the correspondence be-
tween idea and thing is one of identity. 
 But, it is important to point out, as most defenders of the thesis do distancing 
themselves from the idea of correspondence, that the identity thesis avoids the tradi-
tional commitment of correspondentism to the notion of a relationship between ideas, 
meanings, concepts or thoughts with something external to them in virtue of which 
truth can be understood. This way, as Hornsby explains, the identity thesis escapes the 
famous slingshot argument according to which it is not possible to isolate which facts 
correspond to which thoughts without a circular appeal to the individuation condi-
tions of the thoughts. The notion of fact we end up with is one that makes all true 
thoughts identical with the same fact (versions of this argument can be found, 
amongst others, in Frege, Gödel, Strawson and Davidson). 
 I will dwell on Hornsby’s proposal which, as I have mentioned, is inspired by some 
comments on idealism made by McDowell in Mind & World, the same series of talks 
that Michael Luntley mentions as connected with his disciplinary conception of truth. 
McDowell writes:  
Although reality is independent of our thinking, it is not to be pictured as outside an outer 
boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. (...) [before, in the same page] In a particular experi-
ence in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that things are thus and so. That things are thus 
and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgement: it becomes 
the content of a judgement if the subject decides to take the experience at face value. So it is con-
ceptual content. That things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the 
world: it is how things are (1994, p. 26).  
In order to explain the idea that the content of an experience or of a judgement can 
simultaneously be an aspect of the world is immune to the accusation of idealism, 
McDowell refers to an assertion that Wittgenstein found paradoxical: “When we say, 
and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we —and our meaning— do not stop any-
where short of the facts; but we mean: this-is-so.” (Wittgenstein 1953, § 95). The para-
dox, as Wittgenstein explains, is due to our being capable of thinking what is not the 
case. However, the paradox disappears if we consider the ambiguity in “thought”. 
“‘Thought’ can mean the act of thinking; but it can also mean the content of a piece of 
thinking: what someone thinks. Now if we are to give due acknowledgement to the 
independence of reality, what we need is a constraint from outside thinking and judging, 
our exercises of spontaneity. The constraint does not need to be from outside thinkable 
contents” (McDowell 1994, p. 28).8 
8 Perhaps this should be the way to understand Heidegger’s suggestive thoughts about truth in section 44 
of Being and Time. By calling attention to the dual aspect of thought, as disclosing reality and covering 
it up, Heidegger highlights that thought can be distanced from the world by being false, but that there 
is no distance from the world implicit in the very idea of thought. We can also find in Heidegger a 
commitment to an identity thesis about truth sustained in the distinction between the act of thinking 
and what is thought, as well as in a criticism of correspondentism. See Heidegger 1927, especially p. 
260.  
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 Hornsby makes use of this disambiguation to offer her identity theory in terms of 
“thinkables”. I have been faithful to propositions as truth bearers, but it is of interest 
to look closely at Hornsby’s argument to replace proposition, content or thought by 
“thinkable”:  
‘Thinkable’ is a word for a sort of things to which a person can be related in various modes. I say 
that the Labour Party will win the next election. I have just said something (that Labour will win) 
which many now believe [1996], which a good few hope, which John Major fears. The example 
then shows that thinkables can be beliefs, hopes and fears. They are called beliefs when thought 
of in connection with one psychological attitude towards them; they are called hopes or fears 
when thought of in connection with other attitudes. They are thought of as propositions when 
thought of as propounded. A modal term, like ‘thinkable’, may serve to remind one of the variety 
of relations here: it is not only thought which relates to thinkables, because a thinkable can be be-
lieved and hoped, for instance (Hornsby 1997, p. 11).  
Of course, the same person may have several attitudes towards the same thinkable. 
She can also have opposing attitudes to the same thinkable at different times. More 
than one has moved in six years from an attitude of hope to one of desperation with 
respect to Labour’s triumph. Even though it could be argued that it is epistemically 
censurable to expect to win the lottery, in general epistemic censorship limits itself to 
cognitive attitudes toward thinkables. It is precisely this possibility, the possibility of 
believing something that isn’t the case, the one that provokes Wittgenstein’s perplexity 
in the last quote from the Investigations. In order to confront this possibility, Hornsby 
suggests, with Frege9 and McDowell, that “true thinkables are the same as facts” (ibid., 
p. 2). 
 A serious difficulty emerges for a proposal such as Hornsby’s and McDowell’s: are 
facts mundane entities or rather inhabitants of the realm of Fregean senses? It seems 
that any answer would lead to a dead end: if facts are mundane entities —Russellian 
propositions constituted by objects and their properties and relations— then true 
thinkables would cease to be Fregean thoughts, which are constituted by senses and 
only senses. But, if facts are Fregean propositions, constituted by senses, then we go 
back to the beginning: we need a theory that explains the correspondence, not the iden-
tity, between true thinkables/ facts on the one hand and states of affairs on the other. 
 Let us stop to consider what this difficulty is, and see what conception of facts 
leads to it. We have seen that an identity conception of truth can be understood in 
two ways, depending on whether we take propositions, thoughts, to be identical to 
states of affairs or to facts. Julian Dodd (1995) has distinguished between a modest 
and a robust form of identity and accused McDowell of trying to defend both simul-
taneously. The distinction relies on the two conceptions of facts summarized in the 
previous paragraph. McDowell, according to Dodd, holds that facts are true thoughts, 
which would place facts within the realm of Fregean senses (which make out 
thoughts). On the other hand, McDowell uses such an identity to argue that there is 
9 “A fact is a thought that is true” (Frege 1918, p. 35). 
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no principled separation between thought and the world,10 but this would involve 
thinking of thoughts as mundane entities, that is, entities composed of objects and 
properties. But, concludes Dodd, this second identity is incoherent. 
 Max de Gaynesford (1996) has called our attention to this dilemma in similar 
terms: if McDowell opts for a robust theory (he calls it strong), he is in danger of spa-
tializing the faculty of understanding; if he opts for a modest theory (weak) he risks 
idealizing the world. De Gaynesford offers a way out: the notion of de re or object-
dependent sense allows to hold the thesis of our openness to the world (i.e., the thesis 
according to which there is no separation between thought and world) and, simulta-
neously, to avoid the dilemma. Given that senses are modes of presentation of objects 
and that there are indefinite ways for an object to present itself, no sense is identical to 
its object. However, in the de re conception, the identity of each sense depends on the 
existence and identity of its object. This way, the rejection of a separation between 
thought and the world (thoughts depend for their existence and identity on the exis-
tence and identity of facts) does not imply an identity between thoughts and facts (see 
de Gaynesford 1996, pp. 503-7). 
 In an earlier version of this paper I argued that, thinking of objects as the common 
background of a variety of senses (with pride of place for de re senses), there should be 
no difficulty in taking the world to be the totality of ways things could present them-
selves. The rejection of the separation between thought and the world could be, 
against de Gaynesford’s and Dodd’s critique, combined with an identity between 
thinkables and facts. However, discussions with Hilan Bensusan (see Bensusan & 
Pinedo, submitted 2) have made me realize that the notion of de re sense involves an 
unwelcome distinction between meaning and belief. If some senses are especially 
glued to their objects, some of the materials of our thought would infuse their mean-
ing from outside the sphere of thinking practices, making room for a residual given, 
conceptual but still independent of our judgements. The identity thesis and the thesis 
of our thought’s openness to the world do not demand a clear separation between 
understanding and experience, and this paper remains neutral regarding this issue.11 It 
should suffice with a conception of mundane facts that does not involve any sort of 
mediating entity between them and our thoughts.  
 De Gaynesford’s recommendation to give up a separation between thought and 
objective reality without commitment to a strong identity thesis relies on making 
thoughts’ identity conditions dependent upon objects’ identity conditions. Clearly, the 
identity thesis holds something stronger: not only are senses object-dependent, objects 
are also sense-dependent. The existence and identity of a fact also depends on the true 
thought that would capture it: of course, the dependence is slightly weaker, as the de-
10 “[T]here is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing 
one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is 
what is the case. So since the world is everything that is the case (...), there is no gap between thought, 
as such, and the world” (McDowell 1994, p. 27). 
11 For a clear rejection of the separation, see Brandom 1999. 
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mand is not for actual thoughts capturing the fact, but for the thinkability of the fact. 
A proper rejection of the separation between thought and reality cannot allow for the 
possibility of unthinkable facts, on pain on returning to Kantian noumenalism. Hence, 
facts are not to be identified with collections of bare objects and bare properties. This 
fits nicely with the idea that our understanding of the world does not allow for a fact / 
value dichotomy, as the world itself provides the objective discipline required for 
thought (as I have argued in proposing to understand truth as a value). But, further-
more, if we accept that the world has a saying on the correctness of our thought, this 
is only one step short of accepting the need for external reasons, i.e., the acceptance 
that the world such as it is independently of what we actually think, may contain 
evaluative features. If we give up on the search for ‘hard facts’, facts which are at best 
causally responsible for our thoughts, the idea of something in the world having genu-
ine rational impact on our thoughts starts to look more attractive. I have argued 
somewhere else (see Bensusan & Pinedo, submitted 1), that this is the only conception 
of facts available once we abandon the notion of free-standing, noumenal entities af-
fecting our thought from outside. We have called them ‘soft facts’: for the world to be 
thinkable, for it to provide objectivity to our thought without resorting either to a re-
duction of ‘ought’ to ‘is’ or a dichotomy of fact and value, it must be composed of 
soft facts. Soft facts do not need to be contents of actual thoughts, but they must be, 
in principle, thinkable. The alternative account of facts depends on considering a 
purely intuitive, non-discoursive intellect conceivable and on thinking of concepts as 
external, contingent, garments of objects (the rejection of such an account is, for in-
stance, at the core of Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s phenomenon/noumenon dichot-
omy).12 I believe that the almost truist character of the identity thesis about truth, and 
the idea that truth is a value are antidotes against any principled separation between 
concepts and objects. 
 But, will all this really silence the sceptic? I think that the problem may rather be 
whether we have overdone it. Because it could seem that we have done it twice and 
that one of the responses is actually stronger than it needs to be. On the one hand, we 
have told the sceptic that he also needs justification for his challenge, and that the jus-
tification he needs must be given by a background of true beliefs from which to shoot 
doubts. This first line of response, offered by the normative conception of truth, is 
also possible without relating justification with any system of true beliefs: it should be 
enough to point out that scepticism cannot be free-floating. On the other, by closing 
the gap between thought and reality (as the identity thesis about truth does), by de-
fending that the world is its own best representation and that there are no entities 
(Platonic, socially constructed, causal, etc.) mediating between both, it is no longer 
open to him to question our entitlement to appeal to any such entity to explain 
knowledge, truth or meaning.  
 And yet, the sceptic strikes back: which are the facts? How do you know which 
propositions are the case, which thoughts are true? Perhaps these questions help to 
12 I have discussed this issue in Pinedo 2004. 
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remind us that it comes a time when doing philosophy ceases to be necessary, when 
what is left to do is to look around, to check the credentials of our thoughts, to ask an 
expert. But this is not an specifically philosophical task. Everyone should do it. 
6. Conclusion 
In this essay, in order to account for the normativity of language and thought, I have 
explored the relationship between meaning and truth and concluded that truth is a 
value. More precisely, when we say of the content of a judgement or the meaning of 
an utterance that it is true, we do two things: we endorse the content and do so by as-
serting that it is the case. If truth allows to identify thoughts and facts, the kind of au-
thority that permits to evaluate a proposition as true or the following of a rule as cor-
rect is derived from what the world is like, rather than, for instance, from the agree-
ment of the community. Of course, what the world is like cannot be established inde-
pendently of which propositions are true. The identity goes both ways; a fact is both 
something which is the case and a true proposition. By this claim of identity I have 
tried to make explicit the idea that neither thought can be built in terms of reality (as 
the naturalist wants) nor reality can be constructed in terms of thought (as the idealist 
wants; or Thoughts, in the case of the Platonist). By seeing truth simultaneously as a 
value and as something constitutive of facts, one could reject the fact/ value distinc-
tion and accept the existence of evaluative facts. Reality, under this conception, is not 
reducible to a structure of bare referents, but it is already something meaningful, en-
dowed with (Fregean) sense. 
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